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 Abstract  
Many states have recently instituted Ban the Box (BTB) policies, which are aimed at 
reducing post-incarceration employment barriers for ex-offenders by prohibiting employers from 
inquiring about criminal backgrounds on initial job applications. My analysis investigates the 
impact of BTB legislation by looking at state government employment outcomes resulting from 
the introduction of BTB provisions for state government hiring. I utilize a triple difference 
estimation strategy and data from the American Community Survey to evaluate the impact of 
BTB implementation. I look for changes in state employment in those states implementing BTB 
laws after the laws went into effect. Moreover, because of the high rates of criminality amongst 
the African-American high school dropout population, we would also expect BTB to have a 
larger relative impact on black dropouts than white dropouts.  My findings suggest that in states 
with BTB legislation, state employment fell by 0.83 percentage points for black dropouts relative 
to white dropouts in those states implementing these laws after they went into effect. This is the 
opposite of what the policy’s proponents anticipated. These results come with the caveat that the 
impact of the law change does not line up perfectly with the introduction of the law; however, 
this may be symptomatic of large decreases in government hiring due to the recession, which 
coincides with the implementation of BTB. I conclude that BTB may be ineffective at increasing 
ex-offender employment outcomes and may even be reducing employment levels for low-skilled 
African Americans without criminal records, consistent with statistical discrimination.  
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I. Introduction  
  Approximately 65 million Americans are estimated to have a criminal record (Rodriguez 
et al., 2016). As the policy of mass incarceration continues to affect more and more Americans, 
policy makers are trying to develop programs that help these offenders successfully transition 
back into the labor force. Educational and post-prison employment programs are on the rise, with 
many beginning even before the offenders are released from prison. These programs can include 
resume training, education, stipends for employers and personal job search assistance. Despite 
the cost and extensive services of many of these programs, few have been shown to have long 
lasting effects, with most having no effect after one year.  
 To this end, a new policy, “Ban the Box,” has been introduced as a potential way to help 
ex-offenders obtain employment. Ban the Box (hereafter referenced as BTB) prevents employers 
from asking about criminal history on an initial application.  It does not ban private or public 
employers from asking about criminal history subsequently in the hiring process, but postpones 
this question until a later stage.  Different states and municipalities have different timelines 
dictating when criminal background checks can be conducted. BTB is designed to prevent 
employers from immediately eliminating those with a criminal record from their application 
pool, allowing qualified candidates to get further in the application process before having to 
disclose their criminal history. By delaying this identification, it gives the opportunity for ex-
offenders to introduce themselves and their qualifications. It also enables them to detail the 
issues of their criminal history, allowing them to explain the conditions of their arrest, the 
treatment they have obtained post-release, and other factors that would overcome their criminal 
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history in an employer’s mind. The ultimate intent is to enable those with criminal records to 
obtain employment. 
 BTB is a well-intentioned policy, but there are reasons to believe that its impact may be 
limited or perhaps even counterproductive. It provides relatively little in terms of services and 
support for ex-offenders. If programs that were more comprehensive and individually-focused 
had little to no success, then perhaps the efficacy of such a narrow policy would also be limited.  
In fact, BTB may actually even reduce the employment prospects of others who have 
demographic characteristics similar to those who are likely to have been incarcerated; it may lead 
firms to introduce statistical discrimination. BTB legally prevents firms from asking about 
criminal backgrounds, but it cannot force firms to want to hire ex-offenders. If firms remain 
reluctant to hire ex-offenders and cannot determine if a low-skilled individual has a criminal 
record on an initial application, they may rely upon characteristics such as race and lack of 
education to infer criminality.  
Employers’ ability to introduce statistical discrimination is enhanced by the strong 
differences across racial subgroups in incarceration rates. Over 70 percent of African Americans 
who drop out of high school have been incarcerated at least once by age 30, compared to only 15 
percent of white dropouts (Western et al., 2009). If statistical discrimination is a viable force in 
this market and low-skilled African Americans have a high perceived likelihood of a criminal 
record, then this policy could be counterproductive. It could lead firms to associate criminality 
with less-skilled African Americans, reducing their willingness to interview any African 
Americans that have dropped out of high school. This would have no effect on African 
Americans with a criminal record, as they would not have been considered for these jobs 
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anyway. For the low-skilled African Americans who do not have criminal backgrounds, 
however, this would reduce their ability to gain employment.  
Given the recent introduction of BTB laws, the evidence regarding its impact is limited. 
In ongoing work, Agan et al. (2016) conduct an audit study, using a triple difference strategy to 
evaluate employment outcomes before and after BTB implementation. Shoag, et al. (2016) 
utilize a difference-in-difference model using the American Community Survey (ACS) data. 
Although their data and methodology are similar to my own, they do not differentiate between 
public sector and private sector legislation.  
My analysis investigates the impact of BTB legislation by looking at employment 
outcomes resulting from the introduction of BTB in several states in the past decade. These laws 
largely focus on employment in the public sector, and often specifically on state employment. I 
focus on that sector. 
  To assess the impact, I use a triple difference estimation strategy, evaluating the effects of 
BTB legislation on state employment for male dropouts after BTB legislation was implemented 
in these states. I estimate this model separately for African-American and white dropouts. 
Because of the high rates of criminal records among the African-American dropout population 
relative to that for whites, we would expect a differential impact of the law on the two groups.  If 
the employment gains for African-American dropouts is greater than that for whites, then this 
would support a positive effect of the law on employment. If the estimated impact for African 
Americans is smaller, however, it would support a finding of statistical discrimination. 
My findings suggest that in states with BTB legislation, state employment fell by 0.83 
percentage points for black dropouts relative to white dropouts after the law went into effect. 
This results from insignificant gains in state employment for African American dropouts, but 
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increases in state employment for white dropouts. These patterns emerge only later in the post-
enactment period, so caution should be used in interpreting the causal nature of these findings. 
Nevertheless, they do provide an indication that perhaps BTB legislation may be leading to 
increased use of statistical discrimination in the labor market. While more years of data on state 
employment as well as data documenting the effect on private employment resulting from very 
recent legislation is necessary before drawing strong conclusions, this evidence suggests that 
BTB may be another unsuccessful attempt to help improve ex-offender labor market outcomes.  
 
II. Institutional Background and Ban the Box Background 
 Over the past few decades, the United States has become the world’s leader in 
incarceration due to extensive drug and "crime fighting" bills passed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Figure 1 shows the state and federal prison population beginning in 1970, documenting the 
dramatic rise in incarceration. In 2014, the United States incarcerated 2.2 million people in local, 
state and federal prisons (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations 2015). 
African Americans are overrepresented in every age group amongst those incarcerated, 
comprising 13 percent of the US population but over 50 percent of the prison population (The 
Sentencing Project, 2013). Figure 2 shows arrest rates by race over the last 35 years. The figure 
documents that the rise in incarceration has largely been fueled by increases in black arrests. 
African Americans are incarcerated more than their white counterparts for every level of 
educational attainment and the starkest differences occur for those with limited educational 
attainment. Figure 3 documents different rates of incarceration by race and education using data 
from Western et al. (2009). Most strikingly, over 70 percent of African-American males born 
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between 1975 and 1979 who dropped out of high school were incarcerated by age 30, compared 
to only 15 percent of white high school dropouts in the same birth cohort (Western, et al., 2009).  
Although America is imprisoning a high proportion of their citizens, our prisons are 
largely failing to fully rehabilitate offenders. Around 700,000 state and federal prisoners are 
released on a yearly basis (BJS Prisoners in 2014, 2015); 66 percent of these will be rearrested 
within three years and 75 percent will be rearrested within the first five years of release (Durose 
et al. 2014). The statistics for younger prisoners are even more stark: within 5 years of release, 
84 percent of inmates 24 or younger are re-incarcerated (Durose et al. 2014).  
 Many prison advocates claim that recidivism is highly influenced by employment status, 
with the ability to stay employed playing an integral role in staying out of prison. Figure 4 shows 
the correlation between black employment and black incarceration. The pattern suggests that 
black employment is inversely related with black incarceration rates.  This should not be 
interpreted as a causal relationship, as it is unclear if increased percentages of black incarceration 
are a result of poor black labor market outcomes or if higher black incarceration rates lead to 
depressed black employment outcomes. Regardless of which way the causality lies, this pattern 
is consistent with the narrative of reduced employment prospects associated with high 
incarceration rates. One potential cause of this relationship is stigma in the labor market for ex-
offenders. BTB is a policy designed to remove some of the labor market stigma associated with 
criminal status. It was first introduced in Hawaii in 1998 (Rodriguez et al. 2016). The law bans 
employers from inquiring about offender status on initial applications. States have different 
regulations about when a background check can be conducted, with some delaying it until after 
interview rounds. The intent of this program is to prevent employers from screening out ex-
offenders before evaluating their application and interview as a whole. The policy is intended to 
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allow offenders to get to an interview stage where they can, for example, provide further details 
about their criminal conviction or their recovery efforts. By hearing about the personal elements 
of their story, proponents of this policy hope that employers will be more willing to hire these 
ex-offenders.  
Each state that has implemented BTB has a different legislative history but almost all the 
states begin with BTB legislation affecting state employment and then expand the provision to 
cover local government and finally private sector employment.  Currently over 17 states and 100 
cities have adopted these bans for governmental jobs while 6 states and 25 cities and counties 
have laws affecting both the private and public sector (Rodriguez et al. 2016).  
This policy movement is relatively new, with most states adopting the policy in the last 
10 years. It has garnered widespread support from across the political spectrum, including 
President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and the Koch brothers.  Over 21 states have some form of 
public sector ban. These include: California (2010), Colorado (2012), Connecticut (2010), 
Delaware (2014), Georgia (2015), Hawaii (1998), Illinois (2013), Maryland (2013), 
Massachusetts (2010), Minnesota (2009), Nebraska (2014), New Jersey (2014), New Mexico 
(2010), New York (2015), Ohio (2015), Oklahoma (2016), Oregon (2015), Rhode Island (2013), 
Vermont (2015), Virginia (2015), and Wisconsin (2016) (Rodriguez et al. 2016). Figure 5a 
shows the geographic distribution of states that have adopted BTB legislation. The geographic 
variation shows the widespread support of the de-stigmatization efforts. Figure 5b shows 
implementation status by year and documents the relative rise in popularity of BTB. Of the 
policies enacted, six of them were enacted last year. 
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III. Literature Review  
A. Employment Based Programs 
Most labor force rehabilitation programs for the formerly incarcerated involve work 
and/or educational programming. The design behind many of the employment-oriented prisoner 
re-entry programs is to provide inmates with some combination of the following services:   
increased educational training, job skills, support once they leave prison, and subsidies in order 
to help secure employment for the first six months’ post release.  
While many speak about the stain of a criminal record in the labor market, most 
economists will argue that offenders labor market outcomes were already diminished before they 
entered prison. Becker (1974) argues that criminals consider their opportunity costs before 
choosing to commit a crime. For those with low educational attainment and limited employment 
prospects, the cost of crime is lower. Hence, there is probably a strong selection bias for 
offenders. Consistent with Becker’s view, high school dropouts are vastly overrepresented in 
prisons. In addition to a lack of skills before entering prison, time spent incarcerated tends to lead 
to the depreciation of relevant skills. A criminal record is also a negative signaling device, 
potentially suggesting a moral flaw or a level of untrustworthiness. These programs are supposed 
to help counter the negative stigma by demonstrating that the offender can successfully perform 
a job, as well as increasing their job readiness through skill and educational development.  
Despite their promise, very few of these programs have been shown to significantly 
decrease recidivism. One of the most promising programs was evaluated by using a randomized 
control led trial (RCT) conducted by The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL). Braga, 
et al. (2014) evaluate a program that randomly assigned prisoners to a treatment that provided in-
prison training, further job training after release and subsidized employment for the first 6 
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months. Despite the widespread reach of this program, the impacts are limited. They do find 
significant decreases in rearrests but not re-incarceration. One standard condition of parole is to 
obtain and maintain employment, so it is possible that this pattern reflects violation of conditions 
for parole rather than actual criminal behavior. They also find that for those who do not re-enter 
prison within one year, the treatment group has better employment outcomes. While this is 
policy relevant, those that manage to stay out of prison are not representative of the general 
prison population as more than two-thirds of released prisoners recidivate within 3 years (Durose 
et al. 2014). There are many factors beyond labor market skills that influence re-incarceration: 
family structure or support, mental illness, local policing conditions, etc. This is not to challenge 
the results of the study but to suggest that treatment may only be effective for a certain type of 
ex-offender. The limited results of this program challenge the efficacy of employment programs 
to actually help the average prisoner.   
 Other studies find even weaker effects. Farrabee, et al. (2014) used a RCT to evaluate a 
program in southern California that offered job placement and job-skill training for prisoners. 
They found that the treatment group had a higher employment probability and lower re-arrest 
rates in comparison to the control, but neither effect was statistically significant. Cho, et al. 
(2014) evaluated an educational in-prison program and found that the treatment groups that 
received the education programs actually had inferior employment outcomes. This study did not 
use random assignment and instead only had data on which prisoners were required to participate 
in educational programming.  Those that receive educational training are different from those 
who do not qualify, as higher educated inmates were exempt from the requirement which would 
bias employment outcomes downward; however, prisoners who had been incarcerated before 
were also exempt from the program, biasing the coefficients upwards. Programs that do not 
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allow RCTs are difficult to evaluate and thus the research around these types of rehabilitation 
programs are also inconclusive.   
Overall, employment programs have been largely unsuccessful in significantly improving 
labor market outcomes for ex-offenders. This may be less symptomatic of poorly designed 
programs but rather highlight the fact that those with a criminal background already have 
diminished labor market skills before entering prison. Therefore, providing offenders with labor 
market training might not result in a large improvement in their employment status because their 
employment outcomes are already limited. These results cast doubt on the efficacy of BTB. 
Employment programs are much more involved than simply banning a box on a job application. 
If offenders cannot manage to obtain and retain jobs even after participating in programs that 
provide educational training, job skills, resume assistance and employer subsidies, the likelihood 
that BTB will have large effects would seem to be low.  
B. Criminal Background Checks  
In addition to a literature on employment outcomes, there is also research documenting 
the effect of criminal background checks on employment for those with a criminal record. Most 
of the literature documents a clear bias against criminal offenders in hiring decisions. In some 
cases, this deterrent is legally based, as offenders are barred from working with certain 
populations or in certain occupations, rather than due to negative signaling. This literature also 
describes instances of statistical discrimination that occur for non-offenders with characteristics 
that are similar to those of highly offending groups. Using Phelps (1972) and Arrow’s (1973) 
definition, statistical discrimination occurs when agents in a market do not have direct 
information about ability and therefore rely on perceived characteristics of the applicant and use 
the statistical averages associated with these characteristics to be representative of the 
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candidate’s ability. This suggests that statistical discrimination may occur when employers lack 
access to criminal background checks, which prevents them from differentiating between low-
skilled offenders and non-offenders. If they are averse to hiring ex-offenders and cannot 
differentiate with a formal method, they might begin to discriminate based on characteristics. If 
this is occurring, then BTB will have the potential to negatively affect low-skilled African 
Americans without criminal records and have no impact on African Americans with criminal 
records.   
 Finlay (2009) utilizes random variation in internet access in the early 2000s to evaluate 
the effects of employer access to internet criminal background checks using the 1997 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth cohort (NLSY97). He found that those with criminal backgrounds 
had diminished employment outcomes once internet-based criminal background checks became 
available. He also found that non-offenders with personal characteristics similar to high 
offending groups saw increased employment, but the effect is not significant. These results 
suggest both a negative impact of criminal records on employment outcomes as well as a 
possibility of statistical discrimination. Holzer et al. (2004) finds more direct evidence of 
statistical discrimination. They use an employer survey of 3,000 companies in the mid-1990s to 
measure employer willingness to hire different types of candidates. They find that around 40 
percent of companies in the survey are willing to hire people with a criminal record. The survey 
evidence shows that, while only 50 percent of the companies actually conducted a background 
check, companies that did were much more likely to be unwilling to hire someone with a 
criminal record. They also found that those companies that are unwilling to hire a person with a 
criminal record are also much less likely to hire someone with spotty work history or with a 
GED. Additionally, companies that conducted background checks were much more likely to hire 
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low-skilled African Americans. This leads Holzer et al. (2004) to conclude that companies are 
statistically discriminating when they lack access to background checks, attempting to avoid 
hiring ex-offenders. This theory is supported by Autor (2008). He finds that the introduction of 
job tests as a condition of employment did not seem to change the educational or racial 
composition of employees, indicating that managers were effectively statistically discriminating 
before the tests.  
C. Audit Studies  
Audit studies have been valuable tools to decipher discrimination in the labor market. In 
audit studies, fictitious resumes are created and sent to employers. The resume often has 
socioeconomic markers implied by name and/or work experience. Pager (2003) conducted an 
audit study to evaluate the effects of incarceration on hiring rates in low-skill jobs. In her design, 
she had four resumes with similar schooling and job experience but with different racially 
suggestive names and indicators of offender status. She found that white men without a criminal 
record have a call back rate of 34 percent and those with criminal record have a call back rate of 
17 percent. African-American men without a criminal record have a call back rate of 15 percent 
and those with a record have a call back rate of 5 percent. The results of this study indicate that 
there is a large bias against African Americans, even before a criminal record. Therefore, a 
criminal record negatively compounds already diminished labor market outcomes for African 
Americans.  
D. Wage Impact 
 If when ex-offenders reenter society they cannot obtain employment, then according to 
Becker’s theory, their cost of crime is once again diminished. While unemployment is inherently 
a problem, these lower costs can also persist if the only jobs that ex-offenders can obtain are in 
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low-wage occupations. Therefore, considering the types of industries that employ ex-offenders 
post incarceration is important to analyze as an indicator of potential recidivism implications.  
Mueller-Smith (2015) utilizes data from Harris County, Texas and tracks defendants both before 
and after their incarceration. Using variation in courtroom assignment and judge leniency, 
Mueller-Smith found that each additional year of incarceration reduces post-release employment 
by 3.6 percentage points. 
While not explicitly addressing the impact of incarceration on wages in their paper, Braga 
et al. (2014), described previously, found that no person in their study earned an income over the 
poverty line. This includes members of both the control and the treatment groups. These issues 
are further complicated by legal fees that many men owe upon their probation as well as years of 
back child support that can take sizable proportions of fathers’ checks (Holzer et al., 2014). 
BTB is attempting to increase employment. However, if it can only increase employment 
in low-skill, low paying jobs, then the recidivism benefits of employment might be diminished. 
E. Summary  
There are many barriers that offenders must overcome to gain employment; however, 
existing programs do not appear to be improving ex-offenders’ employment outcomes. This 
could be a sign of poor programing or could reflect the fact that most ex-offenders have limited 
skills and low labor market appeal before their incarceration. If it is the latter, it might suggest 
that BTB would be unlikely to overcome ex-offenders’ labor market difficulties. Additionally, 
the literature suggests that banning criminal background checks may open the door to the 
possibility of statistical discrimination harming the labor market prospects of those with similar 
demographic characteristics as ex-offenders, but no criminal record. The remainder of this thesis 
will explore those outcomes directly. 




IV. Data Overview  
 My analysis is conducted using two data sources: the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and the American Community Survey (ACS). NLSY97 is a panel data 
set that follows 9,000 young adults, aged 12-16 in December 1996, through 2014. I utilize data 
through 2010, where the ages of the sample respondents are 27-31. The main variables of interest 
are date of first incarceration, personal characteristics and occupation which I use to evaluate the 
employment and occupation changes that occurred post-incarceration. Since NLSY97 does not 
ask about labor force status in every round—asking only in rounds 1, 4 and 10—I utilize 
information on the number of weeks worked in the past year as a proxy for labor force status. 
This means that I am only able to capture periods of “non-employment” rather than a more 
traditional measure of unemployment.  
For my main analysis of the impact of BTB on employment, I use data from the ACS. 
The ACS surveys one percent of the US population each year (including those in group quarters, 
which would include those who are incarcerated). I restrict my sample to non-Hispanic African-
American and white men, ages 25-45, in order to capture men who are in their prime 
employment and whose educational status is semi-fixed.  I focus my analysis on non-Hispanic 
men, distinguishing them by race, consistent with evidence documenting vast racial difference in 
incarceration rates based on the analysis by Western, et al. (2009). The sample is limited to years 
2008 through 2014 because of data inconsistencies in the variable defining sector of employment 
(public versus private) in the ACS coding prior to 2008.  
The ACS also includes detailed measures of educational attainment, critical for my 
evaluation of the impact of BTB on employment of high school dropouts. Using these data, I 
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define high school dropouts as those who do not have any form of high school degree. This 
means that my definition of a high school “graduate” captures both those with a traditional high 
school degree as well as those who have GEDs. Redefining this measure and counting the men 
with GEDs as dropouts does not change the sign of any result. Additionally, I use the available 
data on employment and sector of employment (public versus private sector), classifying 
individuals as employed in a particular sector if they report employment in that sector and being 
currently employed. Those whose last job was in a particular sector, but are not currently 
employed are not classified as working in that sector.  
 
V. Descriptive Analysis  
A. The Labor Market for African American Men  
It is well-documented that there are large discrepancies in employment outcomes for 
blacks and whites. I confirm these patterns using ACS data on men between the ages of 25 and 
45, described earlier. Figure 6 demonstrates the weaker employment outcomes for African 
Americans, in comparison to whites. Five percent of whites are unemployed and 10 percent are 
out of the labor force, while African Americans in this sample experience a 10 percent 
unemployment rate and 30 percent are out of the labor force. These staggering differences in 
labor force status lead to lower percentages of African American employment in almost every 
sector, except the Federal government, where affirmative action practices have been in place for 
many years. 
Figure 7 shows the ratio of black to white employment rates in the public and private 
sectors, distinguishing the public sector by federal, state, and local governments. These figures 
show employment ratios rather than population ratios, in order to account for large differences in 
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population size. While the African American employment rate in the private sector is 
approximately 70 percent of the white employment rate, they are significantly closer to 1:1 in the 
public sector, achieving approximate equality in the federal government. 
 Although black dropouts are employed in the public sector, the disproportionately high 
concentration of African Americans in the public sector is driven by those with at least some 
secondary education. Of the African Americans employed in the state government, Figure 8a 
shows that 74 percent have at least attended some college. Only 56 percent of African Americans 
employed in the private sector have attended at least some college. This is compared to 85 
percent of white state government employees and 67 percent of white private sector employees, 
shown in Figure 8b, who have at least some secondary education. Black high school dropouts 
only compose 3.3 percent of black state employment and white high school dropouts comprise 
1.1 percent of white state employment. As ex-offenders disproportionately have lower 
educational attainment, the small percentage of dropouts employed by the state government 
indicates that state governments may not employ many low-skilled workers and thus that public 
sector-oriented policies might have little impact on employment for those with criminal records. 
B. The Labor Market between 2008 and 2014 
         The sample period I will be using in my analysis contains the largest recession in the post 
World War II era. Before using labor market data from this period for my analysis, I present 
relevant aggregate statistics that describe the changes in the labor market that took place over 
this period. 
         Figure 9 displays overall employment trends for black and white men aged 25-45 
between 2008 and 2014. It shows large decreases in employment for both white and black men 
from 2008 to 2011, with modest recovery occurring after the initial decline. In 2008, black men 
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had an employment to population ratio of 65 percent. By 2011, this rate fell to 53 percent, a 12 
percentage point drop but an overall 20 percent decrease in employment for black men. In 2008, 
white men had an employment to population ratio of 88 percent, by 2011 this rate fell to 81.6 
percent. Rates of employment began to increase in 2012, with the black employment to 
population ratio eventually rising back to 60 percent by 2014 and the white employment to 
population ratio rising back to 84 percent by 2014. Despite these increases, neither group has 
reached their pre-recession levels. 
Figure 10A illustrates the pattern in public sector employment by race over this period. 
Figure 10B focuses specifically on state employment, a sector that is critical for BTB legislation. 
Figure 10A shows a relatively stable trend of white employment in government sectors, with 8.7 
percent employed in 2008. At the height of the downturn, the employment rate for white male 
public sector employment was still relatively high at 8.5 percent. Blacks, however, experienced a 
large decrease in employment during this time. In 2008, black employment in the public sector 
was at 8.1 percent; however, by 2011 this rate plummeted to 6.5 percent, again an overall 
decrease of employment by 20 percent. The recovery has also not generated large gains in black 
public sector employment, only reaching 6.6 percent by 2014.   
         Despite these patterns in overall public sector employment, the trends in state 
employment are less drastic. Employment for whites and blacks in the state government was 
approximately 3 percent in 2008. Whites saw a modest increase to 3.4 percent by 2014, while 
blacks saw a decrease to 2.6 percent by 2014. Because the white population is so much larger, 
these two statistics are consistent with rising aggregate state employment over this period. 
 Figure 11 displays patterns of state employment in states that enacted BTB legislation in 
2010. These states include Massachusetts, New Mexico, California, and Connecticut. In 2009, 
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the state governments cumulatively employed approximately 755,000 employees. By 2012, 
employment decreased by 20,000 jobs, with overall employment falling to approximately 
735,000 people. Despite the sharp downturn during these years, employment in these states was 
back to its pre-recession high of approximately 755,000 in 2014. This pattern will become 
important subsequently because it shows that the state sector did not begin growing following the 
recession until late in the sample period. 
These figures suggest that there was a downturn in governmental sectors and heavy job 
losses from 2009-2012. State and local governments typically have balanced budget provisions, 
leading them to cut spending—sometimes through employment decreases—during recessions. 
These figures suggest that African Americans experienced job losses at a disproportionately high 
rate in comparison to their white counterparts. This trend of disproportionately high African 
American job loss in the public sector is also documented in the Current Population Survey 
Ongoing Rotation microdata, analyzed by the Economic Policy Institute (Cooper et al. 2012).   
While most African Americans employed in the state government are not dropouts and 
thus have a lower likelihood of criminal history, the public sector would appear to be an ideal 
setting for BTB. The public sector does not have the large discrepancies in employment 
outcomes between African Americans and whites that are found in the private sector. 
Additionally, the state government voluntarily enacted BTB measures, presumably with the 
intention of improving employment outcomes of ex-offenders who are disproportionally black 
and less-educated. The recent downward trend in African-American employment in the public 
sector appears to belie this intention. This pattern, though, may be attributable to other, 
confounding factors. Later in this thesis, I will turn my attention to determining whether we can 
attribute a causal impact to the recently enacted BTB legislation.  
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C. Descriptive Analysis of NLSY Data 
 As described earlier, past research has found evidence of weaker employment outcomes 
for those with criminal records. To confirm these findings, I investigate the impacts of 
incarceration on employment using NLSY97 data. I examine the employment outcomes and 
patterns in occupation changes that resulted post-incarceration. This analysis not only allows me 
to confirm the findings in the previous literature but also adds an additional component: 
evaluating the occupational changes of those with a criminal record.   
The longitudinal nature of the data allows me to look for shifts in employment and 
industry following incarceration after controlling for aging patterns and individual and year fixed 
effects. Specifically, I estimate a regression model of the form: 
 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒./ = β2 +	𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡./ +	𝛽8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2./ +	𝛽:	𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡3./ + 𝛽<	𝐴𝑔𝑒./ +																																																					𝛽?	𝐴𝑔𝑒./8 + 𝛼. + 𝛿/ + 𝜀./		  
 Where 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒./	represents labor market indicators for individual i in year t 
reflecting overall employment or employment in certain occupations, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡./	indicates the year 
following release, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2./ represents two years after release, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡3./ indicates three years 
after release. This specification also includes quadratic age patterns, individual fixed effects (𝛼.) 
and year fixed effects (𝛿/). The modal sentencing length is less than three months and most 
people in the sample were released within one year. However, for those who are incarcerated for 
longer than one year, the Post variables are lagged in order to reflect the true year of release and 
post-incarceration years. I estimate this model for all respondents as well as for multiple 
population subgroups including: men, whites, blacks, one-time offenders, and repeat offenders.  
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I also restrict the sample to the period leading up to and following a respondent’s first 
period of incarceration. Evaluating outcomes for repeat offenders is difficult, as we do not have 
data on subsequent incarceration times. Therefore, it is unclear if employment outcomes are 
driven by unemployment or by incarceration. This is an inherent limitation of the data. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 1 and 2. In order to reflect the pre-
existing differences before incarceration, each table also includes employment averages one year 
prior to first incarceration. Table 1 documents overall employment trends for all respondents and 
separately by population subgroup. There is a large amount of variation in pre-arrest average 
employment. The pre-incarceration employment rate for all offenders is 55 percent. White 
offenders have a pre-employment rate of 66 percent. This is 14 percentage points higher than 
their black counterparts, who have a pre-employment rate of only 42 percent. These stark 
differences are in alignment with both the patterns seen in the previous analysis of African-
American labor market outcomes as well as the employment trends in economic literature. The 
pre-incarceration employment rates for one time offenders and repeat offenders differ by 6 
percentage points, with those who will only be incarcerated once having an employment rate of 
57 percent and future repeat offenders of 51 percent. These differences suggest that those who 
recidivate might be inherently different than those who do not, even before entering prison. 
These results also support Becker’s theory of criminality, indicating that those who regularly 
enter prison have diminished employment outcomes and thus lower opportunity costs.  
The remainder of the table displays regression results from the model specified above. 
They indicate that employment outcomes fall in the period following incarceration. We see 
significant decreases in outcomes in the first year after release with employment decreasing by 7 
percentage points for everyone, 5 percentage points for men only, 12 percentage points for 
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African Americans, 5 percentage points for whites (although this estimate is not statistically 
significant), and 6 percentage points for repeat offenders. The only exception to these decreases 
is seen for those who are only one-time offenders. Their employment prospects remain positive 
but insignificant for all time periods, which may explain why they did not re-enter prison. This 
pattern continues for both two and three years after release, with all groups except one time 
offenders experiencing significant decreases in employment after incarceration. These persistent 
decreases are in alignment with the previous literature, suggesting that incarceration is associated 
with depressed employment outcomes. Additionally, since the modal sentencing length is less 
than three months, it would be unlikely that skill depreciation is driving these employment 
outcomes. 
The decreased levels of employment after incarceration for all groups except one-time 
offenders supports a theory that there is something inherently different about those who do not 
recidivate. The large differences in employment cannot be fully attributed to observable 
characteristics, as the groups are relatively similar. There are racial discrepancies, with whites 
composing 42 percent of one time offenders and 38 percent of repeat offenders. However, the 
average age for both is 22, the average schooling differs by 0.3 grades and the average sentence 
length for those who recidivate and those who do not only differs by 0.43 months.   
For occupation outcomes, I do not disaggregate the NLSY97 data into different groups, 
instead reporting the outcomes for the entire sample. Even before evaluating the regression 
results in Table 2, we see that those with criminal records are less likely to be employed in some 
occupations and more likely to be in others. Primarily, ex-offenders are mainly employed in low-
skill occupations, even before prison. In the year prior to incarceration, approximately 15 and 12 
percent of offenders are employed in the construction and transportation occupations, 
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respectively. After prison, we see a trend of ex-offenders gaining employment in these same 
industries as well as an increases in employment in other low-skill occupations, such as machine 
setting.  
When evaluating employment in security and transportation occupations, legal 
constraints may impact results. Felons are not allowed to purchase guns, disqualifying many of 
them from the security occupation. Many crimes also permanently ban offenders from obtaining 
certain drivers licenses. Most of these disqualifying crimes are for trafficking and drug related 
offenses. Some offenses, including DUIs, also result in suspension of commercial driving 
licenses for a period of at least one year. These legal barriers can prohibit ex-offenders from 
performing these jobs, before even considering employer stigma. We see a decrease of 2.3 
percentage points in employment in transportation, in column 2 of Table 2, in the year after 
release, in keeping with legal constraints. After this initial decrease, we see an increase of 1 
percentage point in employment in transportation two years after release and then a subsequent 
decrease in employment three years after release of 2.7 percentage points. The effects for the 
first two years after release correspond to a decrease in the first year due to a legal suspension of 
licensing and then an increase in the subsequent year, after this suspension has been lifted; 
however, the coefficient on year three after release does not conform to our expectations, 
indicating there may be additional factors affecting employment in this occupation than the ones 
discussed here.   
We see negative effects, although smaller in magnitude, for employment in security 
occupations in column 5 of Table 2. These negative effects are not significant until three years 
after release but are constant in magnitude, all with a -0.1 percentage point decrease in security 
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employment. This is consistent with both the relatively small percentage of ex-offenders working 
in security before incarceration as well as lifetime gun bans for felons.  
I also examine low-skill occupations with little customer interaction and less formal 
hiring processes: construction and production. Most of the coefficients for construction, in 
column 1 of Table 2, indicate a pattern of increased employment in construction after release 
from prison. There is an initial employment increase of 3.4 percentage points, one year after 
incarceration. This effect stays positive and significant at the 10 percent level for both two and 
three years after incarceration. Three years after release, there is an increase of 6.2 percentage 
points in employment in construction occupations, which is significant at the 1 percent level. We 
also see increases for production occupations, factory and machinery jobs. While not all of these 
occupations are low-skill, they all involve little customer interaction. In column 4 of Table 2, 
there is a large increase of 3.87 percentage points into the machinery occupation one year after 
release. This effect diminishes over time but remains positive. Three years after incarceration, we 
see increases of 1.2 percentage points into production occupations, although this effect is 
insignificant. These patterns suggest that there is a post-incarceration migration into these less 
formal sectors; however, the pre-incarceration mean employment rate for construction suggests 
that even before incarceration, there were already a large number of people working in less 
formal sectors.  
          Finally, we look at public sector employment in column 3 of Table 2. The coefficients 
for all time periods are negative. In the first year after release, there is an insignificant 1.1 
percentage point decrease in employment in public sector occupations. The coefficient for two 
years after release is also insignificant and of the same magnitude. The coefficient for three years 
after release indicates a 2.2 percentage point decrease in public sector employment and is 
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significant at the 5 percent level. This decrease in employment may reflect self-selection or may 
be indicative of public sector stigma against offenders. If it is the latter, then BTB may have the 
potential to improve outcomes in state government employment, as it seems offender stigma 
could be factoring into hiring decisions. Alternatively, BTB may induce increased statistical 
discrimination in the public sector. If the state government is unwilling to hire ex-offenders, then 
they may rely on perceived criminality of applicants to ensure they do not hire those with a 
criminal record.  
VI. Empirical Framework 
Using ACS data, my empirical analysis utilizes a triple difference estimation strategy, 
evaluating state employment outcomes. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether 
state public sector employment changed in BTB states for high school dropouts after BTB 
legislation was enacted. I estimate this model separately for whites and blacks. A difference in 
the results by race would be consistent with a causal effect of BTB because of the extraordinarily 
high rate at which black dropouts have criminal records (70 percent) as detailed by Western, et 
al. (2009). If BTB has a causal impact, the employment impact should be larger for blacks than 
for whites. 
Specifically, the econometric model I estimate takes the form: 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡./E= 	𝛽2 +	𝛽5𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡. +	𝛽8𝐵𝑇𝐵𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐E/ +	𝛽:	𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡.×	𝐵𝑇𝐵𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐E/+ 𝛽<	𝐴𝑔𝑒. +	𝛽?	𝐴𝑔𝑒.8 + 𝛽M𝐻𝑆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑. + 𝛽Q𝑆𝑜𝑚𝑒	𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒. + 	𝛿/ + 𝜇E + 𝜀./E	 
Where 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡./E is an indicator for employment in state government for individual 
i in state s in time t, 𝜇E are state fixed effects and 𝛿/ are year fixed effects. 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡. indicates 
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high school dropout status for person i and 𝐵𝑇𝐵𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐E/	indicates if a BTB law affects state 
government employment in state s at time t. Again I estimate this model separately for whites 
and blacks. This allows all the parameters, including state and year fixed effects, to vary by race. 
Including year and state fixed effects allows me to control for employment differences that are 
driven by inherent state characteristics as well as aggregate trends, controlling for variation in 
employment that occurs over time but is not driven by BTB.  All BTB policy variables are 
lagged by one year, in order to allow time for implementation, i.e. updating protocol and forms. 
The states included as BTB “treated” include: Minnesota (2009), Massachusetts (2010), New 
Mexico (2010), Connecticut (2010), California (2010), Colorado (2012), Illinois (2013), 
Maryland (2013), and Rhode Island (2013), where (year) is date legislation passed.  
The main coefficient of interest in this model is β: which indicates the differential 
changes in employment for high school dropouts in states with BTB policies, after these policies 
were implemented, compared to changes in other states over the same time period and compared 
to non-dropouts. I compare these coefficients in models estimated on blacks and whites 
separately. If β: is more positive for blacks than it is for whites, it would indicate that BTB is 
having a positive employment effect for that group, consistent with the intended goal of the 
policy. If, on the other hand, BTB is generating statistical discrimination, we would expect	β: to 
be more negative for blacks than it is for whites, indicating that whites benefited more (were less 
harmed) than their African American counterparts.      
         For the results of this regression to have a causal interpretation, several assumptions must 
hold. Primarily, the differential employment trends for dropouts in BTB states, as compared to 
non-dropouts, must be parallel to the differential trend for non-dropouts in non- BTB states prior 
to BTB implementation, such that in the absence of BTB legislation, the two trends would 
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continue to be parallel. While the parallel trends assumption is fundamentally untestable, I 
address threats to this assumption in the results section.  
 
VII. Results 
Table 3 reports estimates of the impact of enacting BTB for dropouts by race. All 
regressions have both fixed state and year effects. The omitted year is 2008 and the omitted 
education level is college. The coefficient on the interaction between BTB and high school 
dropout for African Americans, as shown in column 1 is -.0009. This would indicate that black, 
high school dropouts in BTB states experiences a 0.09 percentage point reduction in state public 
sector employment after the law went into effect. This estimate for African American dropout 
employment is not statistically significant. The comparable effect for white dropouts, however, is 
significant, with a coefficient indicating white employment in the state government increased 
0.83 percentage points for states with BTB provisions. The magnitude and significance levels of 
these coefficients imply that BTB had a negative or zero net effect for African-American 
dropouts, while improving the outcomes for white low-skill workers. The two coefficients are 
significantly different from each other.  
         If BTB was effective in generating jobs for those with a criminal record we would expect 
the coefficient for black dropouts to be higher than that for white dropouts. However, these 
results show that white dropout employment increased by 0.83 percentage points while black 
dropout employment decreased by .0.09 percentage points (insignificant), creating a -0.83 
percentage point relative decrease in employment for black dropouts. Not only did the coefficient 
on black dropouts not exceed the coefficient for white dropouts, which would have suggested the 
policy was successful, but employment possibly decreased. These results suggest that BTB may 
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be promoting statistical discrimination, as black dropouts saw their employment decrease in BTB 
states, while white dropouts, a counterfactual for measuring trends in low-skill employment, 
experienced a boost in employment of 0.83 percentage points.  
         To better understand what is driving these results, I present Figures 12 and 13, which plot 
state public sector employment separately for dropouts by race in “treatment group states” (those 
that implemented BTB) and “control group” states (Figure 12 for blacks and Figure 13 for 
whites). In these figures, only those states that implemented BTB in 2010 are included in the 
treatment group; states that instituted BTB in different years were not included in this analysis. 
In Figure 12, state public sector employment patterns for blacks are noisy, with no obvious 
difference before and after 2010. This is consistent with the statistically insignificant estimated 
impact of BTB for blacks, described previously. 
However, the graph for white dropouts by BTB status shows a marked increase in state 
government employment in 2013 and 2014. State government employment decreased during the 
recession, from 2009-2012, which is described earlier regarding Figure 11. BTB can only have 
an impact on hiring policies if the government is, in fact, hiring. Therefore, these delayed effects 
could be symptomatic of a lack of hiring in the state government in the years directly following 
BTB implementation.  
These graphs suggest that 2013 and 2014 are the main years driving my coefficients. 
These patterns are confirmed using an event study approach, reported in Table 4, which 
distinguishes coefficients for dropouts by year for both black and white.  All the coefficients for 
African-American dropouts, after BTB implementation, are insignificant, with 2008 being the 
omitted year. This is consistent with the insignificant results in Table 3. White dropouts, 
however, experience a 2 percentage point increase in hiring in state employment in 2014. This 
Wickett, p. 28 
 
 
large boost in hiring in 2014 corresponds with a 27 percent increase in employment for low-skill 
jobs in state government in our sample. This event study confirms the pattern in Figure 13, with 
a large amount of the effect of BTB coming from the later sample years of 2013 and 2014. In an 
event study, one would normally anticipate large effects beginning in the year after BTB 
implementation. However, given the recession and diminished hiring environment of 2011-2012, 
it is unlikely that we would see large employment gains for dropouts when the state government 
was not hiring. More data will be needed to determine if the employment trends in 2013 and 
2014 persist in future years and can thus be attributed to BTB.  
         As a falsification test, I used the same regression model and evaluated if BTB had any 
effect on federal or private employment. This test cannot be run for local government 
employment because some states implemented local and state bans concurrently. Since BTB 
should not affect federal or private employment, at least not directly, and we do not expect large 
spillover effects, we should not expect to get significant results. Table 5 provides the results from 
these regressions. None of the coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level or below. This 
suggests that the results from state employment are not the result of spurious variation or other 
public sector employment trends. 
We also should not see large effects on those with high school degrees, as they are less 
likely to have a criminal records and less likely to face statistical discrimination. I show results 
for high school graduates as another falsification test in Table 6. For high school graduates, the 
coefficients for white is positive and black negative, however, both are insignificant at the 10 
percent level and have a smaller magnitude than their dropout counterpart. Again, these results 
suggest that my finding are not the result of differential trends in states that implemented BTB.  
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VIII. Conclusion & Policy Implications 
         This paper examines the impact of legislation that prevents state government employers 
from inquiring about criminal status on initial applications. Using a triple difference analysis and 
data from the ACS, I find evidence that black dropout employment decreased by 0.83 percentage 
points.  These results suggest that BTB may be reducing employment levels for low-skilled 
African Americans in a manner consistent with statistical discrimination. This finding requires 
the caveat, though, that the timing of the impact of the law change does not line up perfectly with 
the introduction of the law. The period of implementation corresponded with one of the worst 
downturns in US history, which heavily reduced employment, particularly among low-skill 
workers. Therefore, it is possible that my findings are symptomatic of a spurious correlation 
rather than a delayed impact of BTB. As a result, one should not interpret these findings as 
entirely conclusive. 
With additional years of data, it would be possible to see if these public sector hiring 
trends persist for states that passed the law before 2014. Since 2013 and 2014 are the main 
drivers of the current results, later years of data would confirm if the estimated impacts in 2013 
and 2014 are representative of larger trends or spurious. Additionally, states that have adopted 
the legislation in 2014 and onward are currently excluded. We would expect BTB legislation to 
not experience the same type of implementation lags in 2015 as it did in 2010. Therefore, 
evaluating states that passed legislation in a time with a relatively stronger labor market would 
also help to determine the true effects of BTB in the public sector. 
More recent data is also necessary in order to definitively evaluate the impact on the 
public sector and to evaluate the potential impacts in the private sector. Most of the private 
sectors laws were enacted in 2013 or later. Having additional years of data would allow an 
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examination of BTB impact in the private sector. Laws implemented in 2014 and 2015 also did 
not experience the same recessionary labor market conditions, which would allow a clearer 
interpretation of the results. Additionally, there are not a large number of dropouts working in 
the state government, so an analysis of the private employment market would enable us to see 
the impact of BTB on a larger treatment population.  
While public sector results do not directly address private sector impact, they are not 
promising indicators for positive employment impacts in the private sector. While the 
government hires African Americans and whites in somewhat equal numbers, there are large pre-
existing discrepancies in the hiring of African Americans versus whites in the private sector. 
These discrepancies indicate that the private sector may be more affected by racial 
considerations than the public sector.  Overcoming offender stigma is less likely to be successful 
to the extent that racial bias in the private sector remains. 
Those that are advocating for BTB policies tend to be well-intentioned activists and 
politicians. As addressing the problem of mass incarceration continues to retain relative 
popularity for both political parties, it is an opportune time to introduce policies lessening the 
repercussions of the mass incarceration epidemic. However, in doing so, activists and policy 
makers should be cognizant of potential spillover effects in the labor market. Primarily, 
advocates are attempting to make policies that are dependent on lessening offender stigma 
without changing ideas around incarceration. It is unclear how BTB was designed to change the 
opinions surrounding the ability and morality of those with criminal records before interview 
rounds, and as such, employers may still be unwilling to interview these individuals. 
  Any potential increased statistical discrimination would not harm African-American ex-
offenders, as these men frequently experienced poor labor market outcomes and stigma anyway. 
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Rather, if statistical discrimination occurs, those who would be harmed are non-offending black 
dropouts, as they would have a high assumed likelihood of a criminal background. Without a 
“box” indicating criminality on applications, employers may assume these men have a criminal 
record and will not consider them for certain jobs. This suggests that by banning the box, low-
skill non-offending African Americans may be potentially harmed.  
        State and local legislators are enacting these policies; however, in many cases the 
government has yet to lessen employment restrictions due to criminal records in other areas. 
Primarily, having a criminal record prevents you from obtaining employment in certain 
industries by law. While some of these are for the protection of others, e.g. sex offenders cannot 
work in schools, others could be considered unnecessary hindrances. For example, in Illinois 
felons are banned from obtaining licenses to become bingo conductors, blacksmiths, and hair 
braiders (Le et al., 2012). We see the effects of some of these policies in the NLSY97 data 
review, with declines in ex-offenders working in certain occupations. 
 Moving beyond pure labor market outcomes, there are policies in the government that 
stigmatize and deprive rights from those with a criminal background.  Felons are banned from 
voting in many states and prohibited from accessing food and education programs, such as Pell 
grants. If the government is hoping to change the lives of ex-offenders through de-stigmatization 
efforts, eliminating these other restrictions may help alleviate some of the social stigma of 
having a criminal record. 
         Although these are steps the government can take to lessen barriers, my analysis does not 
reveal a clear policy recommendation for improving labor market outcomes for ex-offenders. 
The lack of success demonstrated in existing prison programs, even before evaluating cost 
effectiveness, makes these programs unsuitable for large scale implementation. The NLSY97 
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data also indicated that there might be fundamental differences between those who are one-time 
offenders and those that recidivate. While this evidence is not conclusive, it provides one 
possible explanation for the failure of many programs to significantly improve ex-offender 
outcomes.  
         The premise of BTB is rather hopeful. It is based on a belief that, if employers get to 
speak to ex-offenders, then their opinions and bias might change. My analysis of BTB 
demonstrates that even when well-intentioned activists design policy, unintended consequences 
may arise. Without statistical discrimination, this program could have been considered 
revolutionary, not in its actual efficacy—which would still probably be limited at best—but in its 
acknowledgement of the power of a personal interaction in breaking down stigma. However, the 
evidence suggests not only that employers may fail to live up to the ideals of the legislation, but 
also that the policy may actually induce them to introduce additional forms of bias, in the form of 
statistical discrimination, in response. The unintended consequences of BTB highlight the 
complicated and strenuous battle many ex-offenders face on their path to rehabilitation and 
reintegration. 
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Figure 1: Male Prison Population Over Time
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Figure 2: Arrest Rates by Race per 100,000 
Black
White
Note: Data from Bureau of Justice Statistics and FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program.
Year
































Figure 3: Cumulative Risk of Imprisonment by Age 30-34 for men born 
between 1975-1979, by Race and Education 
White Black



















Figure 4: Mean Percentage of Black Employment and Incarceration,
by State
Note: Author's calculations based on ACS data for non-Hispanic black men aged 25-45 in years 2008-2014.
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Figure 5b: Public and Private State Adoption of Ban the Box by Year
Public Private
Note: Author's calculations based on data from the National Employment Labor Project Ban the Box 
Toolbox (Rodriguez  et al., 2016).
Year
Note: Data from the National Employment Labor Project Ban the Box Toolbox (Rodriguez 
et al., 2016). The graphic only displays the continental United States; however, Alaska has no ban the box 
provisions and Hawaii enacted both a public and private sector provision in 1998.  
Public Sector Legislation 
Private and Public Sector Legislation 
No BTB Legislation 
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Figure 6: Employment Outcomes by Race and Educational Attainment
Unemployed Out of Labor Force State Government Federal Government
Local Government Private Sector Other
Note: Author's calculations based on non-Hispanic black and white men aged 25-45 from ACS years 2008-2014.  





Figure 7: Ratio of Black to White Employment by Population by Sector 
Note: Author's calculations based on non-Hispanic black and white men aged 25-45 from ACS years 2008-2014.





























Figure 8a: Black Employment by Sector and Education
Dropout High School Some College College + 

























Figure 8b: White Employment by Sector and Educational Attainment
Dropout High School Some College College + 
Note: Author's calculations based on non-Hispanic white men aged 25-45 from ACS years 2008-2014.  
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Figure 9: Employment to Population Ratio by Race Over Time
White
Black
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Figure 10A: Percent Employed in Public Sector by Race Over Time 
White
Black
Note: Author's calculations based on non-Hispanic black and white men aged 25-45 from ACS years 2008-2014.  
Year
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Figure 10B: Percent Employed in State Government by Race Over 
Time 
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Figure 11: Overall Employment Trends in State Employment for States with 
BTB Provisions enacted in 2010
Note: Author's calculations based on Census Bureau’s Government Employment & Payroll Survey.
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Figure 12: Percent of Black Dropouts Employed in State Government by 
Ban the Box 2010 Status
Treatment
Control
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Figure 13: Percent of White Dropouts Employed in State Government 
by Ban the Box 2010 Status
Treatment
Control
Note: Author's calculations based on non-Hispanic white men aged 25-45 from ACS years 2008-2014.  
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Table 1: NLSY97 Employment Outcomes for Various Cohorts 
Note: Data use for this analysis is from NLSY97 for the years 1997-2010. Each column reflects the results 
from separate regressions including the listed variables as well as year and individual fixed effects. Standard 


















Employment Averages  
Year Prior to 1st Arrest 
0.546 0.565 0.419 0.662 0.570 0.519 
 
Year Arrested -0.109*** -0.088*** -0.152*** -0.090** -0.104*** -0.062** 
 (0.0223) (0.0250) (0.0338) (0.0376) (0.0347) (0.0307) 
Post 1 Year -0.072*** -0.052* -0.123*** -0.059 0.009 -0.0622* 
 (0.0252) (0.0281) (0.0420) (0.0391) (0.0386) (0.0371) 
Post 2 Year -0.036 -0.032 -0.006 -0.060 0.042 -0.015 
 (0.0275) (0.0310) (0.0464) (0.0440) (0.0425) (0.0427) 
Post 3 Year -0.055** -0.052* -0.042 -0.063 0.078* -0.033 
 (0.0250) (0.0284) (0.0416) (0.0390) (0.0456) (0.0404) 
School 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.050*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0080) (0.0111) 
Age  0.232*** 0.182*** 0.163*** 0.249*** 0.175*** 0.096* 
 (0.0111) (0.0160) (0.0208) (0.0158) (0.0489) (0.0549) 
Age8 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 
 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0011) 
 
       
Constant -1.976*** -1.370*** -1.313*** -2.038*** -0.978* -0.268 
 (0.135) (0.193) (0.253) (0.191) (0.585) (0.666) 
       
Observations 82,021 40,976 21,660 42,224 3,832 3,117 
R-squared 0.453 0.455 0.449 0.436 0.441 0.414 
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Employment Averages  











Year Arrested 0.041** 0.003 -0.018** 0.017 -0.006 
 (0.0168) (0.0158) (0.0084) (0.0110) (0.00374) 
Post 1 Year 0.034* -0.023 -0.011 0.039*** -0.001 
 (0.0188) (0.0161) (0.0102) (0.0131) (0.0060) 
Post 2 Year 0.037* 0.010 -0.012 0.021* -0.008* 
 (0.0212) (0.0192) (0.0102) (0.0127) (0.0046) 
Post 3 Year 0.062*** -0.027* -0.022** 0.012 -0.010*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0155) (0.0088) (0.0110) (0.00371) 
Schooling -0.007*** -0.004*** 0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Age 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0033) 
Age8 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (9.42e-05) (7.34e-05) (6.91e-05) 
Constant  -0.265*** -0.355*** -0.247*** -0.160*** -0.097** 
 (0.0735) (0.0703) (0.0551) (0.0448) (0.0389) 
      
Observations 83,262 83,262 83,262 83,262 83,262 
R-squared 0.426 0.283 0.270 0.296 0.318 
Note: Data use for this analysis is from NLSY97 for the years 1997-2010. Each column reflects the results 
from separate regressions including the listed variables as well as year and individual fixed effects. Standard 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of the Impact of Ban the Box on State Employment for Dropouts, 
by Race 
Note: Data use for this analysis is from ACS for the years 2008-2014 for non-Hispanic black and white 
men aged 25-45. All regressions have sample weights, standard errors are clustered at the state level and 






State Employment for African Americans  
 
State Employment for Whites 
   
BTB Public * Dropout -0.0009 0.0083*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0017) 
Dropout -0.0608*** -0.0513*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0026) 
BTB Public 0.0007 -0.00141 
 (0.0024) (0.0009) 
Age 0.00037 0.000929** 
 (0.0009) (0.0004) 
Age8 4.09e-06 -9.44e-06* 
 (1.20e-05) (5.59e-06) 
Some College -0.0410*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0030) 
High School -0.0508*** -0.0411*** 
 
 
State Fixed Effects 
 

















 (0.0152) (0.0089) 
   
Observations 276,326 1,729,524 
R-squared 0.018 0.013 






Table 4: Event Study for States with 2010 BTB Provisions  
 
Note: Data use for this analysis is from ACS for the years 2008-2014 for non-Hispanic black and white men. 
Regressions control for age, educational attainment, fixed year and state effects, and ban the box status. 
Treatment is defined as living in a state that enacted BTB provisions in 2010. All interactions between treatment 
and educational attainment, year and educational attainment, and treatment and year are also included. All 
regressions have sample weights and standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in 























for Dropouts  
 




     
Treatment*2009*Dropout 0.0059** 0.0053** 0.50% -20.2% 
 (0.0026) (0.0025)   
Treatment*2010* Dropout -0.0029 0.0073*** 0.46% -8.27% 
 (0.0081) (0.0020)   
Treatment*2011*Dropout -0.0102 0.0086*** 0.45% -2.44%  
 (0.0121) (0.0028)   
Treatment*2012*Dropout 0.0006 0.0049* 0.57% 27.2% 
 (0.0075) (0.0027)   
Treatment*2013*Dropout 0.0011 0.0044** 0.48% -15.8% 
 (0.0047) (0.0017)   
Treatment*2014*Dropout 0.0019 0.0205*** 0.62% 28.9% 
 (0.0056) (0.0031) 
 
 
Observations 248,861 1,543,881   
R-squared 0.021 0.014   




Table 5: OLS Estimates of the Impact of Ban the Box on Private and Federal Employment 
for Dropouts by Race 
 
 Federal Employment 
for African Americans 
Federal Employment 
for Whites 




     
BTB Public * Dropout -0.0006 0.0054 -0.0253 -0.0146 
 (0.0074) (0.0057) (0.0162) (0.0143) 
Dropout -0.0619*** -0.0419*** -0.246*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0054) (0.0112) (0.0087) 
BTB Public 0.0053* 0.0005 -0.0057 0.0023 
 (0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0048) (0.0027) 
Age -0.0019 -0.0020** 0.0125*** 0.0066*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0013) 
Age8 3.09e-05 2.03e-05** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 
 (1.99e-05) (9.04e-06) (3.76e-05) (1.75e-05) 
Some College -0.0102** 0.00237 -0.0039 0.0137* 
 (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.00873) (0.0074) 
High School -0.0458*** -0.0238*** -0.0588*** 0.0073 
 
 
State Fixed Effects 
 


























Constant 0.0971*** 0.0865*** 0.359*** 0.567*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0150) (0.0443) (0.0210) 
     
Observations 276,326 1,729,524 276,326 1,729,524 
R-squared 0.041 0.029 0.033 0.012 














Table 6: OLS Estimates of the Impact of Ban the Box on State Employment for those with 
a High School Degree by Race 
 
Note: See Table 3.   
 
 
   
 State Employment for  
African Americans  
State Employment for Whites 
   
High School * BTB Public -0.0009 0.0044 
 (0.0046) (0.0027) 
High School -0.0508*** -0.0414*** 
 (0.0050) (0.00281) 
BTB 0.0009 -0.0020 
 (0.0033) (0.0013) 
Age 0.0004 0.0001** 
 (0.0009) (0.0004) 
Age8 4.11e-06 -9.43e-06* 
 (1.20e-05) (5.59e-06) 
Some College -0.0410*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0030) 
Dropout -0.0608*** -0.0508*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0027) 
State Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Constant 0.0506*** 0.0346*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0089) 
   
Observations 276,326 1,729,524 
R-squared 0.018 0.013 
